Article Summaries
From RhetorClick
- "Nature of the Linguistic Sign" by Ferdinand de Saussure
- "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences" by Mikhail Bakhtin
- "Definition of Man" by Kenneth Burke
In “Definition of Man,” Kenneth Burke takes a fairly dark view of human beings and their use of language. He defines man, using five clauses, as “Man is a symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal/ inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)/ separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making/ goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)/ and rotten with perfection” (53-54). At the beginning, Burke clearly states that his definition is subject to debate and modification. Burke asserts that our symbols-systems are what allow humans to survive and innovate; however, these same systems can also lead to destruction, thus introducing a duality of symbols or language, a main theme in this article. Continuing with the idea of duality, Burke introduces the clause regarding humans as the inventor of the negative, as he claims that nothing in nature is negative and that the negative was constructed by the symbol-systems. He continues to reference language used in the discussion of morality, i.e. the “Thou shall-not.” He believes in stating this negative phrase brings both positive and negative ideas. Then, Burke argues that our symbol-systems construct social networks and norms, etc., that separate us from our natural instincts; in other words, we regard natural occurrences or “things” as negative as a result of language. Furthermore, when he says “rotten with perfection,” Burke does not mean that humans are perfect. He means that humans strive to fulfill their perfect, already formulated ideas. This can lead to political scapegoating and a number of other sad occurrences.
In “How to Read a Page,” I. A. Richards writes at length about ideal strategies for interacting with and making meaning out of texts. He explains the difficulties involved in varying interpretations and outlines some common words that are important, but ambiguous. He then illustrates the complexities involved in reading a page by providing an example: a somewhat abstruse passage written by Aristotle. Richards rewrites this passage in plain English and highlights various distinctions he makes in his rewritten version. His analysis leads him to make the following conclusions about reading pages: it helps to read text keeping in mind vocal emphases to better discern structure (reading aloud), to read slowly and deliberately, and to read with an eye for comparison between meanings—or “translation” in the sense of figuring out the context in which different words are used.
Bryant’s purpose is to discuss the “functions and scope with any system will embrace” (268). There are many confusing meanings to rhetoric, making it difficult to actually analyze. One example of a confusing meaning is rhetoric as the use of empty language (“language used to deceive, without honest intention behind it” [269]). Rhetoric is also referred to as a way of saying anything. Bryant understands rhetoric to be the “rationale of informative and suasory discourse” (271). This rhetoric does not include symbols (stop signs, pictures, colors, sirens, etc.). Rhetors, though they don’t have to be specialists in the subject, must thoroughly understand their subjects, so they can find a way to get their audiences to understand and move. This also implies rhetoric is concerned with appearance; truth has to look true, just as dishonest rhetoric should be realized as dishonest.
Bryant also talks about rhetoric being unavoidable, and that it helps validate the “relations in the idea-audience-speaker situation” (282). The function of rhetoric is to adjust ideas to people and people to the ideas; this has to be done without modifying/distorting the ideas, and the audiences must be prepared “through the mitigation of their prejudices, ignorance, and irrelevant sets of mind without being dispossessed of their judgments” (282). Rhetoric, therefore, works alongside psychological and logical studies and uses imagination and emotion to support reason. Rhetoric is “the organizer of all such for the wielding of public opinion” (285). Rhetoric is used in inquiry and in education (we should teach people rhetoric). Regarding poetry, Sir Philip Sidney claimed poetry can’t lie because it only presents. Rhetoric, however, presents and affirms, so it is characteristic (297).
“Death of the Author” by Roland Barthes discusses and criticizes the emphasis literary critics place on the author while offering an alternative emphasis. The article claims that many have tried to break the idea that so much weight of discourse lies upon the authors. The examples include Mallarme’s attempt to suppress the author in poetics and Valery’s stress on linguistics and the text. Barthes claims that nothing is original because it all comes from already constructed dictionary from which all write. The dictionary, he also asserts, is just a “tissue of signs imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred.” Then, Barthes states that putting an author on the text limits it and potential interpretations. He further states that the existence of writing is “a text...made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations...” All of this multiplicity is thus focused in the readers. They are the ones that have to power to make a variety of different interpretations, emotions, and hold all the traces of text of which the text being read consists. The author can only understand and convey his/her own interpretation. Therefore, “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”
In "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning" Perelman starts his essay by explaining the fall out of classical rhetoric, and how the current rhetoric is different from the definitions it use to have. He doesn’t throw out the idea of classical rhetoric completely, though; he gives examples to show that classical rhetoric was practical, rather than just an empty style. Perelman tells how he discovered what he calls new rhetoric by studying how people make value judgments (connects with dialectical reasoning). Since the new rhetoric is “a theory of argumentation,” it is important to understand what differentiates argumentation from simply demonstrating (153). A demonstration is based off of rules and guidelines that were previously created. In demonstration, the orator/rhetor does not try to persuade or compel his or her audience. Argumentation, however, has the purpose of moving the audience, persuading the audience, communicating with the audience, and getting the audience to listen (154-55). All argumentation, therefore, must be made to be effective to its audience. This is where new rhetoric differentiates from classical rhetoric. New rhetoric “has a wider scope as nonformal reasoning that aims at obtaining or reinforcing the adherence of an audience” (155).
After learning what new rhetoric is, Perelman teaches us how it works. There are the uses of facts, truths, presumptions, values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferable. Facts and truths are things universally agreed upon; the orator does not need to spent his or her time trying to get the audience to believe these facts/truths. Values play the role of moving the audience, influencing their decisions. Perelman mentions that values that may seem universal are really not. He argues there is just a desire for an universal agreement. In any situation, the orator must “know the opinion of [his or her] audience,” so he or she can answer any questions asked (159). The orator must be have prepared his argument with relevant information both to the audience and the subject. They must also know what they considered a strong/weak argument, and what type of argument will get his audience will care for (listen to), and what type of argument his audience won’t care about (159). The orator must choose an effective argument and structure it so his or her audience comes to his or her desired conclusion.
Perelman talks about Quasi Logical arguments that uses an artificial language so “one sign can have only one meaning” (162). There are also arguments that appeal to the real, meaning they are based on reality’s structure. Arguments that attempt to establish the real are arguments trying to generate a reality.
Perelman also discusses how to deal with dissociation. According to him, philosophers use dissociation to move the audience from common sense into a “vision of reality” that doesn’t have conflict of opinions.
“The Cultural Role of Rhetoric” by Richard Weaver discusses the necessity of pairing dialect and rhetoric. His major claim is that societies cannot be secure or stable unless there exists a conjoining of dialect and rhetoric and that “dialect alone in the social realm is subversive” (76). Weaver claims that just focusing on dialect, as was the case with Socrates and is the case with the semantics, is dangerous and alienates dialectical purist from the rest of society. Using the end of one of the greatest and well-known philosophers, Socrates, he explains that the audience he was preaching to was not able to connect to his rationalistic discourse and argumentation. Thus, instead of praising his rational logic and argumentation, the audience felt alienated from Socrates and that he rejects their culture, values, and way of life, especially when he argues that he believes in the gods. As Socrates believes that this argumentation (dialectical) is all man needs and fulfills all man’s needs, Weaver argues that this puristic form of dialect strays to far from the conditio humana (human condition). Thus, rhetoric has the appeal to the human condition that dialect lacks. Weaver states that dialectic deals with inductions and syllogisms while rhetoric deals with examples and enthymemes. While people can follow syllogisms and inductions, they connect with examples and enthymemes. It is the common ground upon which persuasion can occur. Weaver further states that this is why Hellenistic rationalism died out and Christianity spread far and wide -- Jesus appealed to feelings, ideas, and hopes that Hellenistic rationalism could or would not. Weaver goes on to argue against the semantics--those who believe only in dialectic and that each word should have its appropriate definition and words without a secure definition should not be used--using the same principles discussed above. He ends by saying that rhetoric will survive dialectic attack.
In “The Layout of Arguments,” Stephen Toulmin’s thesis is that a new framework is needed for argumentation, as an alternative to the syllogism. The framework (or layout) he proposes involves a claim made due to some data, a warrant (often implicit) given to support the inference of the claim from the data, possibly a qualification added to the claim along with conditions of exception, and backing supplied to provide sufficient grounds for a warrant. Toulmin claims that the syllogism is too ambiguous because, for instance, universal premises (such as “All men are mortal”) do not properly distinguish between warrant and backing. Additionally, with a syllogism one cannot always tell whether a universal premise is true only in theory or in existential, empirical fact. Toulmin explains that logicians have too long relied on the syllogism and that in doing so they have forced arguments into a mold that doesn’t take into account subtle distinctions.
Robert L. Scott begins “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic” by explaining how in the common conception of classical rhetoric (such as Plato’s portrayal in the Socratic dialogues), some people can know the “truth” and must use rhetoric to lead others to the truth. Yet Scott disagrees. Drawing on the work of Stephen Toulmin, he first explains how through the “analytic argument” (i.e., the kind of argument used in the traditional syllogism), one cannot actually gain any empirical knowledge about the world. This is because by nature, the facts of the world are contingent and dependent on time, whereas analytic arguments are meant to be immutable and time-independent. Scott then discusses Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede’s views on debate, saying that the “cooperative critical inquiry” used in debate is a more accurate means for finding—or creating—truth. Scott then explains how understanding the nature of truth has important ramifications in ethics. One must attempt to make the proper moral choices even though no objective standard of truth for ethics actually exists.
In “In Lieu of a New Rhetoric,” Richard Ohmann starts by acknowledging the past perceptions of rhetoric as a “mysterious power” and as a “calculated procedure” bond in the similar characteristic of dealing with persuasion (298). He continues by contrasting the views of many of the new rhetoricians like I.A. Richards, Daniel Fogarty, and Richard Weaver--to name a few. He then states his purpose: “suggest one way in which contemporary ideas of rhetoric...resemble each other more than any of them resembles older ideas” (300). This similarity between the contemporary ideas is that they open the term rhetoric to incorporate a broader spectrum of linguistic activity; this is different from the classical view of rhetoric as persuasion. Ohmann outlines these relationships using five aspects: the relationship between the rhetor and the audience in which new rhetoric encompasses a more mutual relationship, rhetoric as a pursuit versus the transmission of truth, candor as a necessary condition of making rhetoric, the attribution of how much a work reflects the author (only in style says new rhetoricians), and rhetoric reflecting the concepts of a world view (of the world, community, group, or an individual). Ohmann continues to discuss rhetoric in terms of teaching freshman-level college students. He states that the current methods of grammarian rules, etc. are not affective in the classroom. Rather, he proposes a “four-part framework” for teaching freshman. First, the students must understand “the relationship between a piece of writing and its content.Then, they should be taught the “relationship between a piece of writing and its author” and its relationship with the audience (304). And, final idea they should learn is that of the world views previously discussed by Ohmann.
In his essay “On the End of Rhetoric, Classical and Modern,” Halloran lays out a well-organized argument that proceeds logically from part to part, ultimately resulting in the validation of his dissertation, of which this essay was originally a part of. First Halloran defines classical rhetoric as resting on wisdom and the availability of cultural knowledge, going so far as to say that the Renaissance was a rhetorical period based on the model of the “Renaissance man” who is perceived to know everything. Halloran then uses this definition to say that because of our lack of shared worlds and common knowledge, classical rhetoric cannot exist in the world today. He goes onto say that rhetoric can only be possible when speaker and audience “enter into the rhetorical transaction as a serious existential commitment” (338). All of this sets up Halloran’s argument that literature (as distinguished from propaganda by ethos) can be rhetorical for a number of reasons: literature is our means through which we become knowledgeable of the world, it gives shape to one’s self and world, and creates a shared world through which speaker and audience can existentially interact through shared lexicon and grammar. Literature is also concerned with audience, as all rhetoric is, and we can tell this through the use of conventionalized, repeatable patterns, without which literature would be chaotic and privatized.
In “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love,” Jim W. Corder claims that we are all constantly creating and adapting our own narratives and arguments as we live our lives. However, sometimes we will come across the narrative/argument of another that conflicts with or undermines ours. What to do in such a situation? Corder first references the therapeutic techniques of Carl Rogers, which were adapted to a rhetorical philosophy based on mutual understanding of the positions of each rhetor. But Corder thinks this isn’t sufficient to resolve some conflicts, as with heated political issues like abortion or war. In these situations he proposes we “see each other,” “know each other,” “be present to each other,” and “embrace each other” (421). As he writes, argument is not a display or presentation; it is an emergence towards the other: rhetoric should allow for a more commodious space in which conflicting views can coexist. Corder offers a variety of ways to facilitate this, such as learning to argue provisionally, or to remain “perpetually open and always closing” (425).
Most classes now require students compose some of their writing with computers. Since the focus now includes both traditional writing and digital writing, there needs to be an evaluation of what practices work best for digital composing, so professors can be certain students understand the assignments.
In “From Pencils to Pixels,” Dennis Baron asserts that “the computer is simply the latest step in a long line of writing technologies” (118). Before stating his assertion, Baron provides a short glimpse of reactions to technologies, specifically to computers: some love them and some are extremely adverse to them. He also describes the general trend of reactions to new technologies introduced into society: excitement and confusion, tried out, rejected, and adapted into daily life while adapting ourselves to it as well. Baron proves this point by going all the way back to the first writing technology: writing. Since ancient times, many have been skeptical about writing, for some had been used for fraudulent purposes. However, today we are surrounded by text and have adapted ourselves to the written word. Baron continues to describe the development of the pencil. While many are so familiar with this technology that they believe it’s the “natural” and “traditional” way, the pencil was a created as well and changed the writing process. Then came the telegraph to which the creator of the modern pencil--Thoreau--was opposed. Then, he goes on to discuss the controversy of the telephone, in which elicited many unrealized predictions. Finally, Baron discusses the history of computer technology. For the full adaption and acceptance of the computer (like with all other technologies), people need to be able to authenticate the writing to ensure their trust and confidence, in addition to attributing expertise to the author. Since this is so difficult on the Internet, the task becomes creating ways or methods in which people can do that. Baron finishes his article with a few predictions that some have made regarding the future of the computer and the Internet and states that it is still too soon to see what is in store for the future.
